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“Temperate and Nearly Cloudless”:  
The 9/11 Commission Report 
 as Postmodern Pastiche 
 
by Alan Nadel 
“Tuesday, September 11, 2001 dawned temperate and nearly cloudless in the eastern 
United States”. Thus begins Chapter One of the 9/11 Commission Report, a chapter 
that bears the title, “‘We have Some Planes’”. As with all good pop fiction, the reader 
awaits to see what this quote means, although we know already that it will mark a 
crucial moment, one that renders the innocuous urgent, or gives meaning to a 
startling chaos of coincidence. Pop culture has taught us the formula well: Everything 
looks fine; high school kids sip pop and dance in front of the juke box; Ole Doc Jones is 
mowin’ the lawn while Mrs. Jones makes lemonade. BUT strange noises have been 
heard in the cellar; no one can find the cat; Mr. Grundy insists he saw flashing lights 
last night, but no one believes him because Mrs. Grundy says he’s been acting strange 
ever since she flushed his Viagra; mysteriously, all the clocks in Indianapolis have 
started running fast or slow by exactly 24 hours. Then we hear the message on the 
police radio: “we’ve got some planes…as large as football fields hovering over every 
Wall-Mart in the nation”. At last someone will believe the geeky newspaper boy and 
his big brother’s girlfriend, who knew all along he was on to something. Let’s hope it’s 
not too late. 
Terror, as the movies repeatedly show, requires the quotidian, that perfect good 
egg whose absolute normality is just waiting to be cracked. There may be suffering in 
Hell, there may be pain, but there is no terror. Suspense, in fiction as in film, is another 
name for the temporal disparity between established normality and the hinted 
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onslaught that will disrupt and may obliterate. Think of Jaws. In the same way that 
thousands of vacationers flocked to the beach for summer fun, and hundreds of 
merchants engaged in normal summer business, “Millions of men and women,” the 
Report (2004: 3) goes on, “readied themselves for work. Some made their way to the 
Twin Towers, the signature structures of the World Trade Center complex in New York 
City. Others went to Arlington, Virginia, to the Pentagon. Across the Potomac River the 
United States Congress was back in session. At the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue, 
people began to line up for a White House tour. In Sarasota, Florida, President George 
Bush went for an early morning run”. 
In the suspense film or the potboiler novel, the genre itself creates the initial 
disparity between normal life and its threatening other. So too for the Report, in that 
we know September 11 will not be a normal day. Genre expectations, however, must 
be confirmed. Hints of the immanent must appear, simultaneously arousing the 
audience’s concern and also privileging that audience as knowing, better than the 
audience inside the novel or film, how to interpret the missing cat or Mr. Grundy’s 
lights. The Report’s (2004: 3) first hint comes in the second paragraph: “For those 
heading to an airport, weather conditions could not have been better for a safe and 
pleasant journey. Among the travelers were Mohamed Atta and Abdul Aziz al Omari 
who arrived at the airport in Portland, Maine.”  
Irrelevant details, mild irony, and scary names all iterate the idea that terror 
resides in the most commonplace environments. Atta, the Report tells us, took a 
phone call from a colleague at another terminal at Logan Airport. “They spoke for 
three minutes”, the Report (2004:4) states. “It would be their final conversation”. It 
would in fact be another 28 pages before we find out from the Report (2004: 32) that, 
“We have some planes. Just stay quiet and you will be okay. We are returning to the 
airport” – is a transmission from American Airlines flight 11, picked up, to be precise, at 
8:34:28 AM. The chapter title actually reveals, therefore, that the Report has misled the 
reader as much as the terrorists had deceived the passengers or misled air traffic 
control. It has done so by using a chapter title that is supposed to mark a moment of 
revelation and a style that impels such expectations. 
This issue of genre expectations haunts the report from the outset. The “Preface,” 
signed by Chair Thomas Kean and Vice Chair Lee Hamilton (2004: cxxi), announces that 
“we have come together with a unity of purpose because the nation demands it,” and 
states the Commission’s charge simply: “The nation was unprepared. How did this 
happen, and how can we avoid such tragedy again?”. Only a relatively small portion of 
the Report, however, serves to answer those questions. Repeatedly, in its organization, 
rhetoric, blend of descriptions, explanations, assertions, recommendations, and 
platitudes, the Report reveals that the unity of the Commission is wed to – perhaps 
contingent upon – a multiplicity of purposes, something indicated by the final 
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sentence of the Preface (2004:cxxv): “We hope our report will encourage our fellow 
citizens to study, reflect – and act”.   
Explicitly no longer an investigation but a call to action, the Report uses several 
strategies to motivate – that is, to appeal to the reader’s emotions. This explains why 
so much of the Report serves the chief purpose of enthralling the public with a good 
read, evoking the convention of pop culture whereby thrill trumps logic, and attention 
to detail numbs concern over gaps. Richard Falkenrath (2004/5: 177, emphasis added), 
who praised the clarity of the Report’s enthralling prose, comes to a conclusion 
consistent with the rhetorical strategy I am describing, 
 
In short, the commission’s report sweeps away most of the mystery surrounding 
the 9/11 attacks giving the reader a clear and accurate understanding of where the 
attacks came from, how the plot unfolded, what the U.S. government was doing to 
prevent such attacks, and why the government failed.  
 
At the same time, Falkenrath (2004/5: 175) had stated earlier in the same review 
that “the report allows the reader to reach his own conclusions about the many 
important questions raised by the attacks”, an outcome peculiar for a report of a 
commission whose charge was to answer questions surrounding the event. The prose 
that “sweeps away mystery” thus replaces it with an ostensive clarity and accuracy so 
vague that the reader, instead of the Report, must provide the conclusions. If this 
effect ought damn the Report, instead it received much kudos. The Report was widely 
praised for its novelistic qualities.1 
To produce this effect, award-winning historian Philip Zelikow was hired to 
oversee the writing of the Report, an aspect of his job as the Commission’s Executive 
Director at which he was extremely successful. Zelikow convinced Kean, who liked the 
popular history genre – according to New York Times reporter Philip Shenon (2008) he 
was proud of his master’s degree in the teaching of History – that the Report should be 
written for the “general public” and published the same day it was delivered to the 
White House. It is not surprising, in this light, that Zelikow added to the staff Alexis 
Albion, who was completing a history dissertation at Harvard that identified her as an 
expert in espionage and counterespionage, that is, fictional espionage. Her 
dissertation, titled “The Spy in All of Us,” focused on the public image of James Bond in 
the mid-1960s.  
But the purpose for hiring Zelikow is not the same as the purposes he brought to 
the tasks. The vita they reviewed when Co-Chairs Kean and Hamilton considered 
Zelikow omitted the fact that he had also served on the Bush transition team, which 
thus precluded his having to explain what tasks he performed on that team. Most 
significantly, Zelikow had structured the demotion of Richard Clarke and the 
                                                
1 Warren provides a very comprehensive summary of the Report’s reception as “novel”. 
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counterterrorism unit he headed within the NSC that tracked Al Qaeda and generated 
the most persistent and adamant warnings about the threat bin Laden posed. “Clarke’s 
colleagues believed”, Shenon (2008: 63) explains, “that Zelikow’s ‘reorganization’ had 
all but guaranteed that the White House would pay little attention to the flood of 
terrorists warnings in the months before 9/11”.  
Exercising iron-fisted, often brutal control over the Commission staff, Zelikow 
prevented the staff from having virtually any contract with the members of the 
Commission, just as he prevented those Commission members from having 
independent staffers. With all the information channeled through Zelikow, he was able 
to suppress the aspects of the Report most critical of the Bush administration and, 
especially, of NSC Director Condoleezza Rice, whose performance leading up to 9/11, 
many staffers believed, was categorically incompetent (Shenon 2008: 145-146).  
The first chapter of the Report, consistent with Zelikow’s approach, presents in 
melodramatic fashion, almost minute by minute, experiences on each plane in a story 
organized not to explain what happened but to draw out the suspense and to do so 
poignantly, using selected summaries of or excerpts from cell phone calls made by 
passengers and crew. For each plane we follow the events anew, with the appropriate 
sprinkling of human interest: A woman called her mother to tell her the plane had 
been hijacked and ask her to alert American Airlines. She and her husband, the Report 
(2004: 15) tells us “promptly did so.” A man called his father in Easton, Connecticut; 
another left a phone message for his wife and then spoke to his mother. Not 
surprisingly, these calls had common themes: there seems to have been violence, 
stabbings; the planes had been hijacked; the flying was erratic; the callers feared they 
were going to die. As the moments of impact near, the calls become more frenetic: 
“’Oh my God, we are too low.’ The phone call ended” (Report 2004: 11). “’Don’t worry, 
Dad—If it happens, it’ll be very fast—My God, my God’. The call ended abruptly. Lee 
Hanson heard a woman scream just before it cut off” (Report 2004: 13). Only in the 
narrative of the last flight, United 93, in which the passengers stormed the cockpit and 
forced the pilot to crash the plane, do we conclude with the voice of the terrorist pilot, 
who is screaming “Allah is the greatest. Allah is the greatest” (Report 2004: 22).  
After the full series of dramatized crashes, when the Report then replays the 
same events from the perspective of the ground, we finally encounter the “We have 
some planes” transcription. In the first rendition of the events on American 11, in fact, 
we do not even learn that the ground had received transmissions from the plane’s 
radio. And while the chapter title suggests its authoritative presence, “we have some 
planes” does not make sense of the terrifying intervention. Rather than a proclamation 
to the “authorities”, the announcement is apparently aimed at the plane’s passengers 
and overheard on the ground because the inexperienced terrorists could not operate 
the system so as to differentiate an intercom communication from a radio 
transmission. As a result, we do not know who is speaking or what the phrase “have 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Saggi/Ensayos/Essais/Essays 
9/11/2011 – 11/2011     
33 
some planes” means to convey. We know only that the two explicit claims – that they 
are returning to the airport and that “you will be okay” – are false. The chapter’s title 
thus refers to impenetrable utterances from an unidentified source making unreliable 
claims.  
At the end of the opening chapter, with its often-minute-by-minute rendition of 
the events of 9/11, from terrorists boarding planes, to air traffic controllers, Air Force, 
and Government executives (albeit chiefly not President Bush) attempting to deal with 
problems, we are told that “in a brief moment of reflection, [an assistant to the mission 
crew commander at NORAD] was recorded remarking that ‘this is a new type of war’” 
(Report 2004: 70). This nameless assistant enters the Report not to provide analysis but 
to dramatize it. The eternal truth of his relatively vacuous pronouncement—even less 
illuminating than “We have some planes”—is affirmed by the Report’s (2004: 70) voice-
of-God narrator: “He was, and is, right. But the conflict did not begin on 9/11”.  
The voice-of-God narrator, however, is not a reliable source for facts but a 
narrative device that helps sustain the appearance of reality in imaginative writing. 
Similarly, reading the Report we often witness directly a character’s thoughts with a 
degree of immediacy only found in fiction. After the Vice President is told of the first 
crash, the Report (2004: 55) directly penetrates his thoughts at the moment of the 
second crash: “The Vice President was wondering ‘How the hell could a plane hit the 
World Trade Center’, when he saw the second aircraft strike the South Tower”. 
This is one instance of free indirect discourse, among many that frequent the 
Report. This mode of narration, which relates a character’s thoughts as the expression 
of an omniscient authorial voice, is typically associated with psychological realism 
because it presents a character’s mind without mediation, that is, it helps mask the fact 
that the character is fictional. 
Consider, in this light, a discussion in the Report (2004: 219) of Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed (whom the Report renames “KSM”) and another terrorist who “both 
decided to join forces with Al Qaeda because their terrorist aspirations required the 
money and manpower that only a robust organization like al Qaeda could supply”. 
Here the voice-of-God narrator reflects not the knowledge gathered from reports but 
rather a more intimate knowledge of those reported upon. The authoritative narrator 
who is one with the aspirations of its subjects thus substitutes for the less-than-reliable 
sources upon which this part of the Report is based. As the Report (2004: 212) explains, 
“Assessing the truth of statements by [the witnesses who inform Chapters 5 and 7]—
sworn enemies of the United States—is challenging” because the Commission had no 
access either to those being interrogated or to those conducting the interrogations, 
and while the Commission was allowed to submit questions, it “had no control over 
whether, when, or how” the questions would be asked. “We were told,” the Report 
(2004: 212, emphasis added) states, “that our requests might disrupt the sensitive 
interrogation process”.  
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In a similar fashion, the Report (2004: 84) turns Bin Laden into a fictional 
character, employing the omniscient author’s power to articulate Bin Laden’s state of 
mind: “Bin Laden’s assumption of the helm of al Qaeda was evidence of his growing 
self-confidence and ambition” . A little later in the story (2004: 98), Bid Laden 
experiences serious financial setbacks, and then suddenly, with no explanation of how, 
no consideration where he may have gotten his money, no speculation based on 
reported sources, we are told, in a simple, declarative sentence: “Having rebuilt his 
fund raising network, Bin Laden had again become the rich man of the jihad 
movement”. Not just the simplicity of the assertion but the way in which “jihad 
movement” is used here implies a coherent network, in the same way that the term 
“Mafia” often does in American popular culture. The Report, in other words, has 
adopted the voice of Mario Puzo relating the tale of “Godfather” Bin Laden and the 
international crime family he coordinated. Consistent with this narrative style, the 
chapter (2004: 103) ends dramatically with Bin Laden’s “go to the mattresses” 
pronouncement that, “if instigation for jihad against the Jews and the Americans to 
liberate holy places ‘is considered a crime…let history be a witness that I am a 
criminal’”. 
In an equally glib manner, Chapter Two, “The Foundation of the New Terrorism”, 
attempts to provide the historical background for the events dramatically rendered in 
the opening episode of this potboiler. Early in this chapter (2004: 81), we find an Allah-
like pronouncement from President Bush: “All Americans must realize that the face of 
terror is not the true face of Islam”. No information, no documentary support; the word 
of the fearless leader sits comfortably alongside the commission’s omniscient analysis, 
the consistency of the tone marking not the factual nature of Bush’s remarks but the 
fatuous nature of the Commission’s, evident in the way it immediately follows Bush’s 
proclamation with its own, employing the kind of figurative langue typical of fictional 
accounts but inimical to factual reports: “Yet as political, social, and economic 
problems created flammable societies, Bin Laden used Islam’s most extreme, 
fundamentalist traditions as his match. All these elements—including religion—
combined in an explosive compound” (Report 2004: 81).  
Significantly, both of these pronouncements conclude the section of Chapter 
Two devoted to the history of the Islamic world, as context for the attack. That section, 
following two pages on the initial cause, Bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa, provides a scant nine 
pages (of the Report’s 608) on historical and root causes. First the Report covers the 
formation of the Islamic religion and then moves forward to the writings of Qubt, an 
Egyptian educated in the US and executed in 1966 in Egypt. Bin Laden, we are told, 
shared Qubt’s loathing for the West, as configured in stark Muslim/anti-Muslim terms. 
“Bin Laden’s grievance with the United States may have started”, the Report (2004: 77) 
quickly acknowledges, “in reaction to specific U.S. policies”, which the Report for all its 
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obsession with detail, never specifies, explaining instead that his reaction “quickly 
became much deeper”. 
The Report omits any US or Western behavior, apparently too superficial to 
mention, moving immediately to those “deeper” sources, all produced in Arabia, 
which, according to the Report (2004: 77), went through struggles for independence 
after WWI, not led not by religious leaders but by “Western-educated lawyers, soldiers, 
and officials”. In one sentence, the Report (2004: 77) leaps several decades to the end 
of WWII, when, “after gaining independence, the Arab Middle East followed an arc 
from initial pride and optimism to today’s mix of indifference, cynicism, and despair”. 
The Report’s mythical place, less the Arab Middle East than the Arab Middle Earth, 
contains a lot of exotic names and regions, but shares a monolithic sensibility, one 
acquired in the post WWII period, after the influence of the Western-educated lawyers, 
soldiers, and officials had faded. Then, the Report (2004: 77) makes clear, “in several 
countries a dynastic state already existed or was quickly established under a 
paramount tribal family”. Interestingly, the Report seems to have no idea who 
established these dynastic states nor does it ever explain what a “tribal” family is. One 
might assume, however, that “tribal” does not designate the kind of family into which 
Princess Di married, or even the type into which Camella Soprano married. It’s 
something perhaps a bit more sweaty than the British monarchy and a bit more 
primitive than the Mafia. It’s one of those African things, where instead of 
governments, they had, and still have, tribes. 
Just as the West is absent in the formation of this tribal rule, it is equally absent in 
the problems that ensued therefrom, whether in the enduring monarchies or in the 
subsequent secular states that, the Report (2004: 77) informs us, “promised a glowing 
future”. These promises faltered in the Arab Middle Earth when, for various reasons, 
the free market was not allowed to flourish. As a result, it turns out, the social and 
economic cause of the criminal 9/11 attacks was exactly the same as the root cause, 
according to rightwing ideologues, of crime in America: welfare. “In the 1970s and 
early 1980s”, the Report (2004: 79) matter-of-factly states, “an unprecedented flood of 
wealth led the then largely unmodernized oil states to attempt to shortcut decades of 
development. They funded huge infrastructure projects, vastly expanded education 
and created subsidized social welfare programs. These programs established a 
widespread feeling of entitlement without a corresponding sense of social 
obligations”.  
This explanation suggests that the United States is being attacked from the 
outside by the same type of people who are ruining it domestically, the people who 
expect to get something for nothing, something such as education, heath care, or 
food. The problem is even worse, moreover, because in their backwardness, these oil 
states desire “shortcuts”. Even for wealthy, developed countries, such as the United 
States, they should have realized, feeding people and educating them takes time; one 
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can’t foolishly expect to do that over night. In the United States, after all, even today, 
after a solid half-century as the wealthiest nation in the world, 30 percent of the 
population is functionally illiterate, health care is substandard, and one in five children 
suffers from malnutrition.  
The dependence on entitlement programs, moreover, the report makes clear, in 
the end only breeds resentment: “By the late 1980s”, the Report (2004: 79) explains, 
“diminishing oil revenues, the economic drain from many unprofitable development 
projects, and population growth made these entitlement programs unsustainable. The 
resulting cutbacks created enormous resentment among recipients who had come to 
see government largesse as their right”. Lazy malcontents, who want shortcuts, who 
have gotten used to getting something for nothing, who think big government will 
solve all their problems, and who lack any sense of social obligation, in other words, 
people whose tribes were not fortunate enough to have a leader like Ronald Reagan – 
these people, just as they have traditionally constituted the perceived threat to 
capitalism, are now also the ur-cadre of suicide bombers. 
Clearly, at this point, our implied author has morphed from Mario Puzo to Rush 
Limbaugh, casting in a very different light the NORAD crew commander’s 
pronouncement in Chapter One. New or old, was this really a type of war? Perhaps, 
despite the tenor of the voice, the idea is less a Godly pronouncement than a faith-
based initiative, one supported zealously by a White House document, “The National 
Security Strategy of the United States”, that articulates the Bush Doctrine of pre-
emptive strikes. This 31-page document that provides the scholarly underpinnings of 
the Iraq War, was produced at the request of Rice and written anonymously by 
historian Philip Zelikow. This explains yet one more purpose reflected in the report, 
albeit to a far lesser degree that Zelikow wished: to link al-Qaeda to Saddam Hussein.  
Zelikow, therefore, saw to it that in the public hearings devoted to Al-Qaeda, the 
first person to testify was Laurie Mylroie, a historian working for the right-wing Hoover 
Institute, who believed that “Iraq had played a role in every major terrorist attack 
against the United States since the early 1990s, including September 11 and the 1993 
bombing of the World Trade Center. She even saw a link between Iraq and the 1995 
Oklahoma City bombing” (Shenon 2008: 130). 
The seven chapters that follow “We Have Some Planes” provide a series of 
flashbacks, with the focus oscillating in alternate chapters between the terrorists and 
the U.S. Government, such that we have the crosscutting effect used in narrative 
cinema, where two adversaries are racing toward a climactic, possibly catastrophic, 
collision. Zelikow’s narrative, thus structured and paced, does not find room to 
mention the numerous intelligence warnings the White House received and failed 
adequately to heed until after page 300, where the specific intelligence and policy 
failures of the Bush administration look like inevitable complications in an unavoidable 
narrative trajectory. 
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In this forestalling action, Chapter Three, “Counterterroism Evolves”, instead of 
going forward, takes us back, to cover the same period as did Chapter Two, this time 
from the perspective of the government agencies and people charged with thwarting 
al Qaeda. A la Tom Clancy or television series such as 24, the Report (2004: 104, 
emphasis added) indicates that this chapter will focus on personalities and personify 
institutions: “We mention many personalities in this report. As in any study of the U.S. 
government, some of the most important characters are institutions”.  
In this spirit, KSM’s unrealized original plan to coordinate the hijacking of 10 
planes involving nine crash attacks and the dramatic landing of a tenth plane as the 
platform for a speech, leads the Report (2004: 222) to conclude: “Beyond KSM’s 
rationalizations about targeting the US economy, this vision gives a better glimpse of 
his true ambitions. This is theater, a spectacle of destruction with KSM as the self-cast 
star—the superterrorist”. It is important to note here that the Report speaks with the 
greatest authority not when it is providing information it has gathered, but when the 
information confirms the roles into which the narrative has already cast its principals. 
All the details to this point attempt to render the events as though they were a movie. 
Bits of dialogue illustrate attitudes and make melodramatic pronouncements. 
Characters on both sides personify agencies and organizations. Bit players scream for 
help or make final farewells on their cell phones, while arch villains, equipped with 
comic book motivations, hatch master plots, jeopardized by the quotidian desires of 
their henchmen, who insist on meeting with their girlfriends or borrowing money for 
personal reasons.  
The Report, which knows the story it’s telling, tells it well when information 
confirms, or at least doesn’t encumber the narrative. Hence, the exciting chapter, held 
until late in the Report, that recounts what went on in the towers after the planes 
struck, is a compendium of thrilling vignettes – remember Towering Inferno? We also 
get the humanizing moments in which Kalhid al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi come to 
L.A. for reasons, according to the Report (2004: 311), “we do not know for certain” and 
allow their friend to throw a party in their apartment for “20 male members of the 
Muslim community” (Report 2004: 318), or Ramzi Binalshibh enrolls as a student in 
Hamburg in the 1990s but “continually had academic problems, failing tests and 
cutting classes” (Report 2004: 233). In one of the vignettes, we learn that Ziad Jarrah 
discussed in Germany with his dental student girl friend Aysel Sanguen the honor of 
dying for Allah, but, as the Report (2004: 236-7) tells those of us who are following the 
throes of Ziad and Aysel: “Although Jarrah’s transformation generated numerous 
quarrels, their breakups invariably were followed by reconciliation”. Or were they??? 
The fact that these events, as the Report’s disclaimer has previously indicated, may not 
have occurred is not a problem, because it doesn’t matter whether they did, or 
whether Marwan al Shehhi was remembered by his friends in Germany as “‘a regular 
guy’, wearing Western clothes and occasionally renting cars for trips to Berlin, France 
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or the Netherlands” (Report 2004: 234). Irrelevant is the significance of the fact that 
Mihdhar put down a $650 deposit to take over an acquaintance’s apartment lease, 
subsequently sought a refund because he found the apartment too messy, and when 
the landlord refused he “remembers [Mihdhar] ‘ranting and raving’ as if he were 
‘psychotic’” (Report 2004: 318). 
These vignettes serve to humanize the events, make the causes personal, 
psychological, and thus ultimately mysterious. This focus makes irrelevant Bin Laden’s 
articulated motives, his writing and his speeches, as they are only symptoms of 
psychological disorders and/or personal ambitions and/or delusions. In this context, 
befogged reports of Bin Laden’s actions enhance the report rather than diminish it. For 
example, it cites one of his acts as the 1996 truck bomb attack on the tower in Dharan, 
that was, the Report (2004: 89) states “principally, perhaps exclusively” carried out by 
Saudi Hezbollah. Even if it was the exclusive work of Hezbollah, according to the 
Report (2004: 89, emphasis added), there are “signs that Al Qaeda played some role, as 
yet unknown”. The same lack of information informs the Commission (2004: 89), which 
informs us of a series of other attacks in which Bin Laden’s role “is cloudy at best”, in 
contrast to the morning of 9/11, but uncannily similar to the following account of 
President Bush’s role in Vice President Cheney’s issuing a shoot-down order, even on a 
day that was otherwise “temperate and nearly cloudless”.  
Late in Chapter One, Vice President Cheney authorizes the shooting down of a 
commercial aircraft and then informs the President that he has done so. Since only 
President Bush can issue such an order, Vice President Cheney’s order was, by 
definition, given on behalf of the President, and since the Vice President answers to 
the President, Vice President Cheney then informed him (President Bush) how he (Vice 
President Cheney) had used his (President Bush’s) authority, and he (President Bush) 
subsequently confirmed that the order issued by him (Vice President Cheney), was his 
(President Bush’s) order. The Report further confirms that Cheney’s actions were the 
result of a legitimate, if hypothetical, conversation with the President. “We believe”, 
the Report (2004: 63k, emphasis added) states, “this call would have taken place some 
time before 10:10 to 10:15”, pinpointing within a few minutes the exact time of the 
hypothetical conversation during which Bush would have given Cheney the order that 
Cheney subsequently informed Bush he had given. Even more interesting than the 
ersatz precision of a “before/between construction” (“before 10:10 to 10:15”) is the 
Report’s admission that there is no documentary evidence for this call, even though 
one charge of the Commission’s investigation was to document the events of the day. 
Instead, the Report (2004: 63) explains that “the relevant sources are incomplete”. The 
Report thus confirms a hypothetical conversation based, appropriately, on 
hypothetical records.  
This is far from the only moment when the Report ventriloquizes Joseph Heller. 
While the “we have some planes” remark – as we later find out, one of several 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Saggi/Ensayos/Essais/Essays 
9/11/2011 – 11/2011     
39 
overheard cockpit transmissions from American 11 – circulates at the various response 
sites, it provides as much misinformation as information, as the sundry agencies 
scramble to deal with the data, in much the way that, in Catch-22 (1961, 1994: 45), a 
flurry of agitated communication occurs when switchboard operator ex-PFC 
Wintergreen, eavesdropping on Colonel Cargill’s phone conversation, responds to 
Cargill’s statement, “Name for example one poet who makes money”,  
 
“T.S. Eliot,” ex-P.F.C. Wintergreen said…and slammed down the telephone without 
identifying himself. 
Colonel Cargill was perplexed. 
“Who was it?” asked General Peckem. 
“I don’t know,” Colonel Cargil replied.  
“What did he want?” 
“I don’t know.” 
“Well, what did he say?” 
“’T.S. Eliot’,” Colonel Cargill informed him. 
“What’s that?” 
“T.S. Eliot,” Colonel Cargill repeated. 
“ Just ‘T. S.—’” 
“Yes, sir, that’s all he said. Just ‘T.S. Eliot’.” 
“I wonder what it means,” General Peckem reflected. 
Colonel Cargil wondered, too. 
“T.S. Eliot,” General Peckem mused. 
“T.S. Eliot,” Colonel Cargill, echoed with the same funereal puzzlement.  
 
When Peckem decides, with an “unctuous and benignant smile” (Heller 1961, 
1994: 45) to call General Dreedle and leave the same anonymous message, Dreedle 
retaliates in kind, 
 
“Who was it?” asked Colonel Cargill, back in Rome. 
“That same person,” General Peckem replied with a definite trace of alarm. “now 
he’s after me.” 
“What did he want?” 
“I don’t know.” 
“What did he say?” 
“The same thing.” 
“‘T.S. Eliot’?” 
“Yes, ‘T.S. Eliot’. That’s all he said.”….”Perhaps it’s a new code or something, like the 
colors of the day….Why don’t you have someone check with Communications….” 
 
Communications answered that T.S. Eliot was not a new code or the colors of the 
day (Heller 1961, 1994: 46). In a similar fashion, we watch the phrase, “we have some 
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planes” work its way through the FAA airwaves, after we are told, for the second time 
that, 
 
At 9:03, United 173 crashed into the South Tower. 
Meanwhile, a manger from Boston Center reported that they had deciphered what 
they had heard in one of the first hijacker transmissions from American 11: 
BOSTON CENTER: Hey…you still there? 
NEW ENGLAND REGION: Yes, I am. 
BOSTON CENTER: …as far as the tape, Bobby seems to think that the guy said that ‘we 
have some planes’. Now I don’t know if it was because it was the accent, or if there’s 
more than one, but I’m gonna, I’m gonna reconfirm that for you. And I’ll get back to 
you real quick. Okay? 
NEW ENGLAND REGION: Appreciate it. 
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE VOICE: They have what? 
BOSTON CENTER: Planes, as in plural 
BOSTON CENTER: It sounds like, we’re talking to New York, that there’s another one 
aimed at the World Trade Center. 
NEW ENGLAND REGION: There’s another aircraft? 
BOSTON CENTER: A second one just hit the Trade Center. 
NEW ENGLAND REGION: Okay. Yeah, we gotta get—we gotta alert the military real 
quick on this. (Report 2004: 35) 
 
This part of Chapter One tells the story again, plane-by-plane, anecdotally, this 
time with portions of the inter- and intra-agency communications transcribed 
verbatim, instead of the phone calls from those aboard the planes. While these 
transcriptions retain grunts and fragments that reflect the suspense and confusion of 
the moment, like the phone calls from midair, they report almost nothing we do not 
already know.  
Perhaps more revelatory, if also more ambiguous, is Chapter One’s fourth 
retelling of the events (after a third version is done with maps and timelines), which 
describes a confused administration, with the President continuing to read to grade 
schoolers after Andrew Card tells him “America is under attack,” because “his instinct 
was…not to have the country see an excited reaction at a moment of crisis” (Report 
2004: 60). That this is theater rather than a commission report is clear. 
Less so, what kind of theater. Attempting to sustain its Tom Clancy voice, the 
narrative moves from site to site showing the government agencies snapping into 
action, but in the end the action comes less close to resembling The Hunt for Red 
October than Dr. Strangelove. The usurpation of Presidential authority suggested by 
sections of the Report pales in comparison to the way the Report usurps authorial 
authority. If the tenor of this absurdity recalls Joseph Heller, the vast accumulation of 
unanchored narratives creates a cumulative effect more reminiscent of Pynchon. The 
aura of Clancy and Puzo start to fade, in other words, at the point where the revelation 
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of plot, meaning conspiracy, has facilitated twists in the plot, meaning story, such that 
the narrative, having established the coherence of the threat, should allow that 
coherence to facilitate the intervention and abortion that restores the order initially 
implied by people lining up for popular tours or going out for an early morning jog, by 
children playing with beach balls or Mr. Grundy not seeing lights.  
But how, indeed, will normality ensue, how will the plot straighten things out, 
when instead of Mr. Grundy on Viagra, it is Donald Rumsfeld on steroids or Dick 
Cheney on a defibrillator? And how will the disparity between norm and disruption be 
resolved when neither the norm nor the disruption can find full articulation? While its 
prose is more pedestrian, therefore, the Report’s structure is Pynchonesque – a series 
of delays infused with facticity –indicating a plot’s presence but not its shape, not its 
purpose, not its possibility for resolution. 
At another terminal in Logan Airport, for example, five more hijackers boarding a 
United Airlines flight had trouble, according to the ticket agent, “understanding the 
standard security questions and she had to go over them slowly until they gave the 
routine, reassuring answers” (Report 2004: 4). Their comprehension problems 
notwithstanding, the agent was ultimately “reassured” when she succeeded in 
evoking their claim that they had indeed packed their own luggage, that they had not 
been given anything by a stranger. The implication, of course, is that the least 
reassuring aspect of this event is the fact that the answers were “reassuring”. In the 
end, they only assure us that the procedures assure nothing. 
A few years ago, when I had gone to the relatively small airport in Albany, New 
York, to pick up my son, the United States had just gone to a higher level of alert, and 
in response the Albany Airport police were stopping each car approaching the 
terminal. I rolled down my window. “Do you have any explosives in your trunk?” the 
officer asked me. “No”, I said. “OK-Go ahead”, he replied, and I drove on, reassured by 
the knowledge that no matter where in the lot I parked, the drivers of the cars on 
either side of me had provided the same, routine “reassuring” answers. 
The structural inability to provide reassuring answers, applies not only to the 
terrorists but indeed the whole Report, exactly because of its structure as a post-
modern novel. “Once it became clear”, Craig A. Warren (2007: 549) accurately explains, 
 
that the book was not the stiff and cluttered document that the public expected, 
the Report became available to as many different literary interpretations as there 
were interpretations of 9/11 itself. It was suddenly and simultaneously a trauma 
memoir, mystery novel, espionage thriller, confessional, legal brief, episodic history, 
cautionary tale, and work of fantasy. While it is true that the Report borrowed from 
the conventions of many of these genres, it also refused to accommodate any one 
genre above all others. Few works of literature fit within the categories that scholars 
and booksellers promote, but it is nonetheless striking to see how flexible the 
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report proved to be, satisfying the needs and interests of a diverse readership 
whose interpretations of 9/11 at times varied widely.  
 
What Warren call “flexibility”, in other words, reflects a repression, the return of 
which pervades the Report.  
The Report’s authoritative voice substitutes authorial control for exactly what the 
report and the people who authorized it, and the groups who impelled them to do so, 
and the people they are addressing lack: control of events. This is exactly what makes 
the report so post-modern, in that one characteristic of postmodern fiction, as I (1995: 
39) wrote many years ago, is that postmodern authors realize that they have complete 
control over history and no control whatsoever over events. In that respect, the genre 
pastiche does not make the Report postmodern, but rather symptomatizes the 
postmodern condition from which it is produced. The Commission’s power to author 
this history derives from the fact that it is paradigmatically fictional, such that its style 
both deflects and reflects its estrangement from any totalized reality, whether it is the 
mechanisms that motivated the attack or those that allowed it to succeed, those that 
assembled around the catastrophe or those that rippled out from it. 
The Report is situated, moreover, in an array of frames, each of which 
recontextualizes it in a different way. As published in paperback by St Martin’s Press, 
“with reporting and analysis by The New York Times” (cover and front page), the report 
contains 125 pages, paginated in roman numerals. This prefatory section covers, 
according to the table of contents, “Background on the 9/11 Commission” (28 pages), 
“Times Coverage of the Report” (44 pages), “Executive Summary of the 9/11 Report” 
(34 pages), lists of illustrations, tables, commission members, and staff (8 pages), and 
the “Preface” to the report (5 pages). Then follows the 608-page report, plus 27 pages 
of appendices. All of the contexts supplied by the report, already framed by the 
circumstances that mandated it, are thus twice more framed by the New York Times, 
once in excerpted reports about the creation of the commission, and once in 
excerpted reports about the Report, and about what the Report reports. Like the 
Report itself, which organizes most of its chapters as narrative chronologies, this 
prefatory material privileges the unfolding of events over the categorical synthesis of a 
capacious topic. And like the Report it is structured by chronology more than by 
appropriateness or reliability. Repeatedly, for example, sources indicate a relationship 
between bin Laden and Iraq, only to conclude that “we have seen no evidence that 
[the meetings that sources report may have taken place] developed into a 
collaborative operational relationship. Nor have we seen evidence indicating Iraq 
cooperated with al Qaeda in developing or carrying out any attacks against the United 
States” (Report 2004: 97). 
Similarly, in Chapter Seven, (melodramatically titled “The Attack Looms”) we 
follow the activities of the nineteen attackers in the months leading up to 9/11, even 
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though, as I noted earlier, the Report has explicitly stated that the chapter is based on 
unreliable information. Also, as we have seen, much of it is irrelevant. When Hazmi and 
Mihdhar first arrived in Los Angeles, in January 2000, they attended a mosque in 
Culver City, where, it is speculated, an imam named Thumairy “may have had a role in 
helping the terrorists” (Report 2004: 313). After discussing the contact between them 
and Thumairy, the Report (2004: 314) tells us both that Thumairy’s claim not to 
recognize either of them was “somewhat suspect” and that he met and counseled 
“countless individuals…so he might not remember two transients like Hazmi and 
Mihdhar”. “The circumstantial evidence”, the Report (2004: 314) goes on to explain, 
“makes Thumairy a logical person to consider as a possible contact for Hazmi and 
Mihdhar. Yet, after exploring the available leads, we have not found any evidence that 
Thumairy provided assistance to the two operatives”.  
Literally, the Report explains that is has discussed Thumairy in order to explain 
that there is no reason to discuss him. Rhetorically, however, the passage, like the al 
Qaeda-Iraq red herrings, implies the fissure between logic and evidence, situating its 
implied narrator as speaking from the world of the uncanny, where logic is not 
supported by evidence but at odds with it, a world where raison d’etre has supplanted 
raison, where the only idée is the idée fixe, a place where a monomaniacal obsession 
with transcendent verity discounts the things of this world. Over information gathered 
from the “available leads”, the report here privileges a logic based on unavailable 
leads, exactly the same kind of sources that supported Vice President Cheney’s use of 
the President’s authority to order the shooting down of a commercial airplane.  
Pointing out that the Report provides a great deal of information about the day-
to-day activities of the terrorists, Kim Phillips-Fein (2007: 167) notes that “we are given 
only the barest interpretation of their motives, which the commission deems 
inexplicable”. But the inexplicable in the Report does not indicate the need for further 
investigation and explanation, but rather permits that which is beyond explanation. 
Understandably, therefore, Phillips-Fein (2007: 167) sees the report as leaving readers 
“with the understanding that one day, nineteen men decided to commit suicide and 
mass murder by flying planes into American landmarks – and act of unfathomable evil. 
The report, in other words, leaves us exactly where we began”.  
Perhaps it is appropriate in a report on terror that the uncanny should authorize 
everything, from the mindset of the terrorists to the authority to counterattack, to the 
authority to speak on behalf of the 9/11 Commission. What could be more uncanny 
than the fact that the ethos of the Commission is omission. And sins of omission are 
prolific. In a particularly metafictional moment, chief author Zelikow appears as a 
character in his own narrative. In describing the Bush transition in regard to 
counterterrorism, we are told “Rice had asked University of Virginia history professor 
Philip Zelikow to advise her on the transition” (Report 2004: 288). A footnote then 
informs us that “Rice and Zelikow had been colleagues on the NSC staff during the first 
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Bush administration and were coauthors of a book concerning German unification 
(Zelikow and Rice 1995). As the Executive Director of the Commission, Zelikow has 
recused himself from our work on the Clinton-Bush transition at the National Security 
Council”.2 The problem is that as author of the document (or boss of those who 
authored this section), Zelikow has also recused himself from responsibility for the 
demotion of Richard Clarke’s unit responsible in the NSA for tracking al Qaeda. If it was 
Zelikow’s work, at Rice’s behest, that relegated Clarke to that status, Zelikow as Bush 
employee was one major source of the culpability that Zelikow as Executive Director of 
the Commission was charged with uncovering. In the collapse of text and referent, of 
author and character, that typifies metafiction, author Zelikow omits discussion of 
character Zelikow in the same way that Rice coauthor Zelikow omitted his role as a 
character in the Bush transition team from his vita when he interviewed to become 
Executive Director and chief author of the 9/11 Omission Report.  
The admission of this omission is signaled by the footnotes, which themselves 
have been omitted from the paperback edition of the Report: 1700 endnotes, 119 
pages (of the online version), twenty percent of the entire report. The reader of the 
paperback version, for whom all the sources are unavailable (or only available extra-
textually), cannot know that the notes not only cite sources but also often provide 
discursive contexts for the Report’s utterances. Nor are these contexts always 
supportive of the statements made in the text.  
For example, the famous Presidential Daily Briefing report, “Bin Laden 
Determined to Strike in the U.S.” (Report 2004: 376) printed in its 450-word entirety is 
accompanied by a 461-word footnote, part of which indicates that the claim near the 
end of the Presidential Briefing, stating that “the FBI is conducting approximately 70 
full field investigations throughout the United States that it considers Bin-Laden 
related” is erroneous, as the footnote explains: “The 70 full-field investigations number 
was a generous calculation that included fund-raising investigations. It also counted 
each individual connected to an investigation as a separate full-field investigation. 
Many of these investigations should not have been included, such as the one that 
related to a dead person, four that concerned people who had been in long-term 
custody, and eight that had been closed well before August 6, 2001”.3 Certainly this 
information, critical as it is of the FBI, is central to the charge of the Commission, not 
something to be buried in one of 1700+ footnotes. Even here, the Report fails to state 
                                                
2 This appears as note 165 of chapter Six. Since footnotes are not included in the paperback text 
that is the subject of this essay, the page number for this citation (506) of the online document where 
the footnotes can be found would not be consistent with the parenthetical citations I have been using. 
3 This appears as note 37 of chapter Six, page 535 of the online document. 
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how many relevant investigations actually were under way, information it must have 
had to compose this note. Consider that if each of these alleged full field 
investigations employed two FBI agents (a modest number for a full field 
investigation) then 70 reduces to 35, thirteen of which should not have been counted, 
leaving 22, which include an undisclosed number of fund-raising investigations. Being 
generous to the FBI and to the Commission, it seems safe to say that the FBI was really 
conducting no more than 18 and more likely fewer than a dozen relevant 
investigations. 
As I have tried briefly to suggest, the use of countless frames to reveal the “true” 
parameters of the event, the use of fictional devices to reveal the facts, and the use of 
ideological cant to claim the political high ground, all indicate the postmodern quality 
of the Report. Since the facts that this postmodern pastiche attempt to obscure 
preclude the conventional closure of a fictional potboiler, whereby catastrophe is 
either averted or revenged, the Report shifts the register from suspense to hope, in the 
form of a series of recommendations, many of which are actually vague ideals, lauded 
because they seemed more efficacious than the Cheney administration’s program at 
the time, which could be summed up as: take off your shoes at the airport and invade 
Iraq. Consider how much more useful, to give one example, is the Report’s (2004: 549-
50) recommendation that: “The United States should combine terrorist travel 
intelligence, operations, and law enforcement in a strategy to intercept 
terrorists…and constrain terrorist mobility”.  
I’m all for it; if we could just stop those terrorists from moving around, the planet 
would be safer. And that is, it turns out, the overall goal of the Report (2004: 517), 
because, as it explains, “9/11 has taught us that terrorism against American interests 
‘over there’ should be regarded as we regard terrorism against America ‘over here’. In 
this same sense, the American homeland is the planet”. 
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